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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent years, information privacy has emerged as one 
of the central issues of our times.  Today, we have hundreds 
of laws pertaining to privacy – the common law torts, 
criminal law, evidentiary privileges, constitutional law, at 
least twenty federal statutes, and numerous statutes in each of 
the fifty states.  To understand the law of information privacy 
more completely, it is necessary to look to its origins and 
growth.  Technology has played a large role in the story of 
the emergence of information privacy law.  Frequently, new 
laws emerge in response to changes in technology that have 
increased the collection, dissemination, and use of personal 
information.    
II. COLONIAL AMERICA 
 
 To the colonists, America afforded unprecedented 
privacy.  As David Flaherty notes, “[s]olitude was readily 
available in colonial America.”2 From the crowded towns 
and cities of Europe, America’s endless expanse provided 
significantly more space and distance from other people.3 But 
many people still lived in small towns, where everybody 
knew each other’s business.  As Flaherty observes: “The 
population in the early years was still so small that no person 
could escape the physical surveillance of others without 
special efforts.”4  
 Even in the early days of colonial America, there was 
some limited legal protection of privacy.  The law had long 
protected against eavesdropping, which William Blackstone 
defined as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves 
of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame 
                                                 
2 DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 1 (1972). 
3 Id. at 33.  
4 Id. at 2.  
 1
 slanderous and mischievous tales.”5  The common law also 
sanctioned being a common scold, a law that applied only to 
women.6   
 The law had long protected one’s home. The maxim that 
the home is one’s castle appeared as early as 1499.7  More 
well-known is a judicial pronouncement in Semayne’s Case8 
in 1604 that “the house of every one is to him as his castle 
and fortress.”9  According to William Blackstone, the law has 
“so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s 
house that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be 
violated with impunity.”10   
 At the time of the Revolutionary War, the central privacy 
issue was freedom from government intrusion.  The Founders 
detested the use of general warrants and writs of assistance.11  
Writs of assistance authorized “sweeping searches and 
seizures without any evidentiary basis”12 and general 
warrants “resulted in ‘ransacking’ and seizure of the personal 
papers of political dissenters, authors, and printers of 
seditious libel.”13  As Patrick Henry declared: “They may, 
unless the general government be restrained by a bill of 
rights, or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and 
                                                 
5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
168 (1769). 
6 See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6-7 
(1978). 
7 Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1892, 1894 n.18 (1981). 
8 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604). 
9 Id. at 195. 
10 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
223 (1769).  
11  Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse 
than the Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1994); see also LEONARD W. 
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999).  
12 Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth 
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 82 (1998).  
13 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); 
see also William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 
105 Yale L.J. 393, 406 (1995). 
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 rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, everything you eat, 
drink, and wear.  They ought to be restrained within proper 
bounds.”14 
 The Framers’ distaste for excessive government power to 
invade the privacy of the People was forged into the Bill of 
Rights in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The 
Third Amendment protects the privacy of the home by 
preventing the government from requiring soldiers to reside 
in people’s houses: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, 
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law.”15 
 The Fourth Amendment provides broad limitations on the 
government’s power to search and to seize: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.16 
 
 The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from 
conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.”17  
Government officials must obtain judicial approval before 
conducting a search through a warrant supported by probable 
cause.   
 The Fifth Amendment affords individuals a privilege 
against being compelled to testify about incriminating 
information.18  In other words, the government cannot 
compel individuals to divulge inculpatory information about 
themselves.   
                                                 
14 3 THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1974). 
15 U.S. CONST. Amend. III. 
16  U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. 
17 Id. 
18  See U.S. CONST. Amend. V. 
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 III. THE 19TH CENTURY 
A. NEW THREATS TO PRIVACY 
  
 The 19th century experienced a series of new threats to 
privacy and a growing concern about protecting privacy. 
 
1. The Census and Government Records 
 
 For much of the 19th century, state and federal 
governments did not keep extensive information about 
citizens.19  During the late 19th century, government record-
keeping at the state and local level began to increase with the 
rise of progressive regulation.20 
 The primary form of information gathering by the federal 
government was the census.  The first census in 1790 asked 
only four questions.21  The number of questions increased 
with each census, growing to 142 questions in 1860.22  These 
questions were increasingly delving into personal details.  To 
make matters worse, since 1790, copies of the census were 
posted in public places so people could check errors.23  This 
practice stopped in 1870.24   
 When the 1890 census asked about diseases, disabilities, 
and finances, it created a public outcry, which ultimately lead 
to the passage in the early 20th century of stricter laws 
protecting the confidentiality of census data.25  For example, 
                                                 
19 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 12 (2000). 
20 Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. 
L. REV. 1892, 1906-07 (1981). 
21 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, 
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 46 (1995). 
22 See id.  
23 See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 19 
(1978). 
24 See id. 
25 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, 
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 47 (1995). 
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 in 1919, Congress made it a felony to publicize census 
information illegally.26  
 
2. The Mail 
 
 Since colonial times, the privacy of the mail was a 
significant problem.  Sealing letters was difficult.27 Benjamin 
Franklin, who was in charge of the colonial mails, required 
his employees to swear an oath not to open mail.28 And in 
1782, Congress passed a law that mail should not be 
opened.29 
 Nevertheless, significant concerns persisted about postal 
clerks reading people’s letters.  Thomas Jefferson, Alexander 
Hamilton, and George Washington frequently complained 
about the lack of privacy in their letters, and they would 
sometimes write in code.30  As Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
“[T]he infidelities of the post office and the circumstances of 
the times are against my writing fully and freely.”31   
 These problems persisted in the 19th century. As Ralph 
Waldo Emerson declared, it was unlikely that “a bit of paper, 
containing our most secret thoughts, and protected only by a 
seal, should travel safety from one end of the world to the 
other, without anyone whose hands it had passed through 
having meddled with it.”32  The law responded to these 
problems. Congress passed several laws protecting the 
                                                 
26 See id. 
27 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 23-25 (2000).  
28 Id. at 49; PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, 
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 46-49 (1995). 
29 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 50 (2000). 
30 Id. at 50-51; see also DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW 
ENGLAND 115-27 (1972). 
31 Thomas Jefferson in 1798, quoted in DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1978). 
32 Quoted in ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY 
AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 56-57 (2000).  
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 privacy of the mail.33 In 1825, Congress enacted a statute that 
provided:  
 
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any 
post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or 
from any letter or mail carrier, . . . before it has been delivered 
to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct 
the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of 
another, or opens, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be 
fined . . . or imprisoned.34 
 
 In 1877, in Ex Parte Jackson,35 the Supreme Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibited government officials 
from opening letters without a warrant: “The constitutional 
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers 
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their 
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may 
be.”36   
 
3. Telegraph Communications 
 
 The burgeoning use of the telegraph raised a number of 
privacy problems.  Shortly after the telegraph’s invention in 
1844,37 technology to tap into telegraph communications 
emerged.  As Priscilla Regan observes: 
 
During the Civil War, the Union and Confederate armies 
tapped each other's telegraph communications to ascertain 
battle plans and troop movements.  Rival press organizations 
tapped each other's wire communications in order to be the 
first to report major news items.38  
                                                 
33 Id., at 50-51. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 1702.  This law is still valid today.  See ROBERT ELLIS 
SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 51 (2000). 
35 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
36 Id. at 733. 
37 See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 123 (2000). 
38 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
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 After the Civil War, Congress began to seek access to 
telegraph messages maintained by Western Union for various 
investigations.39 This raised a considerable outcry among 
some members of Congress.40  Additionally, a New York 
Times editorial decried the practice as “an outrage upon the 
liberties of the citizen.”41 Another editorial in the New York 
Tribune complained that the seizure of telegrams “violates 
the commonest legal maxims as to the right to call for papers, 
and outrages every man’s sense of his right to the secrets of 
his own correspondence.”42  A New York Sun editorial stated 
that “the idea that every curious and prying legislative 
committee may cause to be spread before the public 
everything that has been sent over the wires will be hateful 
and repulsive to the people in general.”43 
 These problems resulted in a growing congressional 
debate about whether telegrams should be accorded similar 
privacy protections to letters.44  A bill to protect the privacy 
of telegrams was introduced into Congress in 1880.45  The 
bill would ultimately be abandoned.  But beyond 
congressional attempts to obtain telegraph communications, 
the law responded to restrict other entities from breaching the 
privacy of telegrams. Several courts quashed subpoenas for 
telegrams, analogizing them to letters.46  As the Missouri 
Supreme Court stated in quashing a grand jury subpoena for 
                                                                                                    
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1995). 
39 See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 69 (2000); DAVID J. 
SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1978). 
40 See SEIPP, RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at 31.   
41 Id. at 31.   
42 Id. at 35.   
43 Id. at 36.   
44 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 69 (2000). 
45 DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 
(1978). 
46 Id. at 40.   
 7
 telegrams: “Such an inquisition, if tolerated, would destroy 
the usefulness of this most important and valuable mode of 
communication.”47  State legislatures also responded by 
passing laws to prohibit the disclosure of telegraph messages 
by telegraph company employees.48  More than half the states 
enacted laws.49   
B. THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS 
 
 Ex Parte Jackson was not the only major development in 
Fourth Amendment law in the 19th century.  In 1886, the 
Court decided the landmark case of Boyd v. United States.50  
The government wanted to compel a merchant to produce 
documents in a civil forfeiture proceeding.  The Court, 
however, held that the documents could not be compelled, 
basing its conclusion on both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments: 
  
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right to personal security, personal 
liberty and private property. . . . [A]ny forcible and 
compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his 
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime 
or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that 
judgment.  In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendment run 
almost into each other. 
 
 Boyd and subsequent cases created a powerful protection 
of one’s papers and personal information.  In the 20th 
century, this protection increasingly interfered with the 
growing administrative state.  As William Stuntz notes, 
“[g]overnment regulation required lots of information, and 
Boyd came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a 
                                                 
47 Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (1880).   
48 DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 65 
(1978). 
49 Id.  
50 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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 blanket entitlement to nondisclosure.  It is hard to see how 
modern health, safety, environmental, or economic regulation 
would be possible in such a regime.”51  As a result, the Court 
began to retreat from Boyd throughout the 20th century.52   
C. PRIVACY OF THE BODY 
 
 Another important Supreme Court privacy case of the 
19th century established protection against physical bodily 
intrusions.  In 1891, the Court held in Union Pacific Railway 
Company v. Botsford,53 that a court could not compel a 
female plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical 
examination: 
   
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a 
compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow.  To compel 
any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to 
submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is 
an indignity, an assault, and a trespass . . . .54 
 
This case is one of the earliest recognitions of what would 
later come to be called “substantive due process privacy.”  
 The sanctity of the body was also recognized in the 
common law, even prior to the birth of the privacy torts 
following Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s article.  In 
De May v. Roberts,55 an 1881 case, a physician allowed a 
“young unmarried man” not schooled in medicine to be 
present while the plaintiff gave birth.  The court reasoned:  
 
It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and 
propriety to doubt even but that for such an act the law would 
afford an ample remedy.  To the plaintiff the occasion was a 
most sacred one and no one had a right to intrude unless 
                                                 
51 William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal 
Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1050 (1995).   
52 See Part IV.B.5 infra. 
53 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
54 Id. at 252. 
55 9 N.W. 146 (1881). 
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 invited or because of some real and pressing necessity.56  
D. WARREN AND BRANDEIS’S THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
 
 The most profound development in privacy law was the 
publication in 1890 of Warren and Brandeis’s article, The 
Right to Privacy.57  According to Roscoe Pound, the article 
did “nothing less than add a chapter to our law.”58 And Harry 
Kalven, Jr. referred to it as the “most influential law review 
article of all.”59 
 The article was inspired, in part, by a vastly expanding 
form of media – the newspaper. In the second latter half of 
the 19th century, newspapers were the most rapidly growing 
type of media.  Circulation of newspapers rose about 1000% 
from 1850 and 1890, from 100 newspapers with 800,000 
readers in 1850 to 900 papers with over 8 million readers by 
1890.  Increasingly, newspapers reported on sensationalistic 
topics such as scandals and gossip about people’s lives, a 
type of journalism that became known as “yellow 
journalism.”60  As Warren and Brandeis observed: “The press 
is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of 
propriety and decency.  Gossip is no longer the resource of 
the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is 
pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”61   
 Warren and Brandeis were also concerned about a new 
technology: “instantaneous photograph[y.]”62 Cameras had 
                                                 
56 Id. at 148-49. 
57 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
58 ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946). 
59 Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 31 L. & Contemp. Probs. 326, 327 (1966). 
60 William L. Prosser, Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 104, 104 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 
1984) (noting rising popular dismay over “yellow journalism” at the time 
of Brandeis’ and Warren’s article). 
61 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
62 Id. at 195. 
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 been large, expensive, and not very portable.  In 1884, the 
Eastman Kodak Company produced the “snap camera,” a 
hand-held camera for general public use.  People could now 
take candid pictures in public places.63  Warren and Brandeis 
anticipated a dangerous mix between this new technology 
and the sensationalistic press: “Instantaneous photographs 
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts 
of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’”64      
 These new threats required a remedy.  The difficulty was 
that the existing common law did not currently afford much 
of a legal protection of privacy.  Defamation law—the torts 
of libel and slander—protected against false information, not 
true private information.  Contract law could protect privacy 
within relationships formed between parties, but it could not 
protect against privacy invasions by third parties outside of 
the contract.  Warren and Brandeis observed: 
 
While, for instance, the state of the photographic art was such 
that one’s picture could seldom be taken without his 
consciously “sitting” for the purpose, the law of contract or of 
trust might afford the prudent man sufficient safeguards 
against the improper circulation of his portrait; but since the 
latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to 
take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of 
trust are inadequate to support the required protection.65 
 
 Property law was also inadequate to protect privacy.  As 
Warren and Brandeis observed: “[W]here the value of the 
production is found not in the right to take profits arising 
from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief 
afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all, it is 
                                                 
63 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY 
LAW 3-4 (2003). 
64 Id.  
65 Warren & Brandeis, Right to Privacy, supra, at 211.   
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 difficult to regard the right as one of property.”66   
 Warren and Brandeis argued that the common law could 
readily develop a remedy for protecting privacy.  The authors 
noted: “The common law secures to each individual the right 
of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”67  
These rights were not based upon property.  Rather, they 
were based upon “the more general right of the individual to 
be let alone.”68 From this more general right, protections 
against privacy violations could be derived in the common 
law.69  Warren and Brandies discussed a number of remedies 
to protect privacy, with the principal remedy being “[a]n 
action of tort for damages in all cases.”70   
IV. THE 20TH CENTURY 
A. 1900 TO 1960 
 
1. Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Torts 
(a) Early Recognition 
 
 It wasn’t until the early 20th century that courts began to 
confront the issue of whether to extend the common law to 
redress privacy invasions as Warren and Brandeis had 
suggested.  In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals 
confronted the issue in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box 
Co.71 An advertisement by Franklin Mills Flour used a 
lithograph of Abigail Roberson without her consent. 
Roberson sued, alleging that she had been “greatly 
humiliated by the scoffs and jeers of persons who have 
                                                 
66 Id. at 200.   
67 Id. at 198.   
68 Id. at 205.   
69 See id. at 205. 
70 Id. at 219.   
71 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
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 recognized her face and picture on this advertisement, and 
her good name has been attacked, causing her great distress 
and suffering, both in body and mind.”72  The court, 
however, refused to recognize a cause of action because there 
was “no precedent for such an action to be found in the 
decisions of this court” and the creation of such an action 
would more appropriately be achieved by the legislature 
because the courts were “without authority to legislate.”73 
 The Roberson decision sparked a significant debate. A 
New York Times editorial criticized the decision, observing 
that it “excited as much amazement among lawyers and 
jurists as among the promiscuous lay public.”74 A note in the 
Yale Law Journal attacked the decision criticized the 
Roberson decision for not recognizing a remedy for the 
“undoubted injury to the plaintiff.”75 Another law review 
article declared that Roberson “shocks and wounds the 
ordinary sense of justice of mankind.”76  As a result of this 
wave of criticism, one of the judges in Roberson defended 
the opinion in the Columbia Law Review.77   
 In 1903, just one year after the decision, New York 
enacted a statute establishing a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy.78 The law still remains on the books today.79  
 A couple of years later, in 1905, the Georgia Supreme 
Court recognized a common law tort for privacy invasions in 
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company.80  In 
facts similar to Roberson, a life insurance advertisement used 
                                                 
72 Id. at 442.   
73 Id. at 447-48. 
74 New York Times, Aug. 23, 1902, reprinted in Denis O’Brien, The 
Right to Privacy, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 437, 437 (1902). 
75 Comment, An Actionable Right to Privacy?, 12 Yale L.J. 34, 36 (1902). 
76 36 American L. Rev. 636, quoted in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. 
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 the plaintiff’s image without his consent.  The court 
concluded that a “right of privacy in matters purely private is 
. . . derived from natural law.”81  As the court reasoned:  
 
One who desires to live a life of partial seclusion has a right to 
choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which he 
will submit himself to the public gaze.  Subject to the 
limitation above referred to, the body of a person cannot be put 
on exhibition at any time or at any place without his consent. . 
. . It therefore follows from what has been said that a violation 
of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the 
individual.82  
 (b) William Prosser and the Restatement 
 
 In 1960, renowned tort scholar William Prosser surveyed 
the over 300 privacy cases that were spawned by the Warren 
and Brandeis article.83  Prosser concluded that the cases 
recognized four distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; 
(2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light or 
“publicity”; and (4) appropriation.84  Today, the vast majority 
of states recognize most of these torts.85  The most recent 
state to do so was Minnesota in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc.,86 where the state Supreme Court finally recognized the 
Warren and Brandies torts in 1998.87    
 (i) Intrusion Upon Seclusion.  As defined by the 
Restatement of Torts, intrusion upon seclusion provides:  
 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
                                                 
81 Id. at 70. 
82 Id. 
83 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).  
84 Id. 
85 See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).  
86 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998). 
87 Id. at 235. 
 14
 reasonable person.88   
 
 Intrusion upon seclusion protects against electronic 
eavesdropping into conversations in the home,89 as well as 
the deceitful entry and clandestine photographing of 
activities in the home.90  The tort is not limited to intrusions 
into the home.  In a case involving well-known consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader, the court held that an attempt by 
General Motors to hire people to “shadow” him and “keep 
him under surveillance” could be tortious if the surveillance 
was “overzealous.”91   
 (ii) Public Disclosure of Private Facts.  The tort of public 
disclosure of private facts provides: 
 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life 
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of 
legitimate concern to the public.92   
 
 In an early case, Melvin v. Reid,93 the court held that the 
use of an ex-prostitute’s maiden name in the movie The Red 
Kimono could give rise to a public disclosure action.  Courts 
have sustained public disclosure suits for publishing a 
photograph of a woman whose dress was blown up 
involuntarily by air jets;94 for the publication of an article 
describing a person’s unusual disease;95 and for posting a 
large sign in a window stating that the plaintiff owed a debt.96   
 The Supreme Court has curtailed the scope of the public 
                                                 
88 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B.  
89 Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964). 
90 Dietemann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). 
91 Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).   
92 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D. 
93 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931). 
94 Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964).   
95 Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).  
96 Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927).   
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 disclosure tort.  In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,97 the Court held 
that “[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court 
documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be 
sanctioned for publishing it.”98  In Smith v. Daily Mail,99  the 
Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the 
publication of the names of juvenile offenders:  “If a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter 
of public significance then state officials may not 
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a 
need to further a state interest of the highest order.”100  And in   
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,101 the Court held that a newspaper 
could not be liable for publishing the name of a rape victim 
obtained from a police report.102  These decisions 
notwithstanding, the Court has repeatedly avoided addressing 
the constitutionality of the public disclosure tort, and it has 
confined its holdings to relatively narrow contexts.   
 (iii) False Light.  The tort of false light is defined as: 
 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that 
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
   (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
   (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard 
as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in 
which the other would be placed.103   
 
(iv) Appropriation. Pursuant to the Restatement:  
 
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for 
                                                 
97 420 U.S. 469 (1975) 
98 Id. at 496. 
99 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
100 Id. at 103. 
101 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
102 Id. at 532. 
103 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E. 
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 invasion of his privacy.104    
 
 In the mid-20th century, an offshoot of the appropriation 
tort emerged, referred to as the “right of publicity.”105  The 
right of publicity originated in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc.,106 where the court declared that “in 
addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man 
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the 
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his 
picture, and that such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’ 
i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of 
anything else.”107  According to Thomas McCarthy, “while 
the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by 
an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by 
an injury to the pocket book.”108 
 The emergence of the right of publicity is often viewed as 
distinct from appropriation, but is sometimes viewed as 
merely a dimension of the appropriation tort.  William 
Prosser did not recognize a distinct tort of publicity, and 
neither did the Restatement.109 
 
2. The Emergence of the Breach of Confidentiality Tort 
 
 Beyond the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, another 
tort emerged in the common law in the medical context – the 
tort of breach of confidentiality.  For example, in 1920, in 
Simonsen v. Swenson,110 the court recognized that 
                                                 
104 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C. 
105 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 
(2000); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 203 (1954). 
106 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
107 Id. at 868. 
108 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 
5:61, at p. 5-110 (2000). 
109 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY 
LAW 162-63 (2003). 
110 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920). 
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[t]he relation of physician and patient is necessarily a highly 
confidential one. It is often necessary for the patient to give 
information about himself which would be most embarrassing 
or harmful to him if given general circulation. This 
information the physician is bound, not only upon his own 
professional honor and the ethics of his high profession, to 
keep secret . . . A wrongful breach of such confidence, and a 
betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action for the 
damages naturally flowing from such wrong.111 
 
The Simonsen court concluded that the breach of 
confidentiality tort is not absolute, and it does not apply 
when disclosure is mandated by statute or when disclosure 
will protect the health and safety of others.  As one court has 
stated: “A majority of the jurisdictions faced with the issue 
have recognized a cause of action against a physician for the 
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information unless 
the disclosure is compelled by law or is in the patient’s 
interest or the public interest.”112 
 Some courts have held that because the breach of 
confidentiality tort emerges from the patient-physician 
relationship, analogous to a fiduciary one, the tort extends to 
a third party who “induces a breach of a trustee’s duty of 
loyalty, or participates in such a breach, or knowingly 
accepts any benefit from such a breach, becomes directly 
liable to the aggrieved party.”113 
 
3. The Growth of Government Record Systems 
 
 The rise of the administrative state in the first half of the 
20th century resulted in the creation of elaborate systems of 
public records.114   For example, the Social Security System, 
                                                 
111 Id. at 832. 
112 McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); see also 
Biddle v. Warren General Hospital, 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999). 
113 Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (D. 
Ohio 1965). 
114 See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY 
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 created in 1935, required that records be maintained about 
each employed individual’s earnings.  To administer the 
program efficiently, a unique nine-digit number was assigned 
to each citizen, known as the Social Security number (SSN).  
The number was only to be used for the Social Security 
system, and it was not designed as a general identifier, with 
social security cards stating that SSNs were “NOT FOR 
IDENTIFICATION.”115  As will be discussed later, this 
number soon was used for a myriad of other purposes.   
 
4. The Telephone and Wiretapping 
(a) The Fourth Amendment: Olmstead v. United States 
 
 The early 20th century witnessed the growth of telephone 
communication.  Shortly after the telephone was patented in 
1876, methods of intercepting communications through 
wiretapping were developed.116  As with telegraph 
communications, there was a growing concern about the 
privacy of telephone communications. State legislatures 
responded with new legislation.  For example, in 1905, 
California expanded its 1862 law against intercepting 
telegraph messages to telephone calls.117 
 In 1928, the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United 
States118 confronted the issue of whether the Fourth 
Amendment required a warrant before the government could 
engage in wiretapping.  The Court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to wiretapping because it did not 
involve trespass inside a person’s home: “There was no 
searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence was secured 
                                                                                                    
LIFE 73 (2001). 
115 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND 
CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 288 (2000). 
116 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1995). 
117 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE, supra at 157. 
118 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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 by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was 
no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”119   
 Justice Louis Brandeis dissented.  Although he did not 
cite to his article, The Right to Privacy, his dissent reflects 
many of its central ideas.  Brandies argued that new 
technological developments necessitated revising traditional 
views of the Fourth Amendment in order to preserve its 
purpose of protecting privacy:  
 
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have 
become available to the government.  Discovery and invention 
have made it possible for the government, by means far more 
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in 
court of what is whispered in the closet.120 
(b) Federal Communications Act § 605 
 
 Despite the Court’s opinion in Olmstead, wiretapping 
continued to be viewed with considerable distaste. Justice 
Holmes called it a “dirty business.”121  One year after 
Olmstead, J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, stated that 
“while it may not be illegal . . . [wiretapping] is unethical and 
it is not permitted under the regulations by the Attorney 
General.”122  Hoover declared that any FBI employee 
engaging in wiretapping would be fired.123  Ironically, 
Hoover went on to become one of the greatest abusers of 
wiretapping. 
 Six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted § 605 of the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934.124  Section 605 
provided: “no person not being authorized by the sender shall 
                                                 
119 Id. at 464. 
120 Id. at 473. 
121 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); see also RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 49 (1987). 
122 Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 
107, 127 (1986). 
123 Id. 
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 intercept any communication and divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of 
such intercepted communications to any person.”125  The 
statute only applied to federal, not state, officials.  According 
to the Supreme Court, § 605 prohibited evidence obtained by 
wiretapping from being used in court.126  But the statute did 
not restrict officials from engaging in wiretapping, only from 
disclosing intercepted communications in court 
proceedings.127   As a result, wiretapping by the FBI and state 
law enforcement officials increased dramatically throughout 
the 20th century.128 
 
5. The FBI and Increasing Domestic Surveillance 
 
 The FBI was originally formed in 1908 amid substantial 
opposition in Congress to a federal police force.129  Indeed, 
Congress never directly authorized the creation of the FBI by 
legislation.  At first, the FBI was known as the Bureau of 
Investigation (BI); it became the FBI in 1935.130  Throughout 
the 20th century, the FBI expanded in size and in the scope 
of its surveillance activities.     
 During World War II, the FBI received a profoundly 
expanded authority to engage in wiretapping and investigate 
national security threats.  The FBI seized upon fears of 
Communism during the 1950s to increase its ability to 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence directly 
obtained by wiretapping excluded from evidence); Nardone v. United 
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 engage in electronic surveillance.131  Hoover greatly abused 
his powers as head of the FBI.  He wiretapped his critics and 
people whose views he disliked, and he maintained an 
elaborate system of files about the personal lives of hundreds 
of prominent individuals, politicians, professors, and others.  
Hoover despised Martin Luther King, Jr., and he engaged in 
a systematic surveillance of him, including wiretapping and 
bugging his conversations.132  When the FBI learned of 
King’s extramarital affairs, a high level official sent King a 
letter suggesting that King commit suicide or else the 
recordings of his conversations would be “bared to the 
nation.”133   
 Hoover’s abuses came to light a few years after his death, 
when in 1975, Congress’s Church Committee conducted an 
extensive inquiry into Hoover’s activities.134 
 
6. Freedom of Association and the McCarthy Era 
 
 The Civil Rights era led to attempts by some Southern 
states to expose the names of those involved in the civil 
rights movement, subjecting people to community sanctions.   
In NAACP v. Alabama,135  the Court held that the NAACP 
could not be compelled to disclose the names and addresses 
of its members.  According to the Court, there is a “vital 
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in 
one’s associations.”136 This was because revelation of 
membership in the NAACP exposed members “to economic 
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and 
other manifestations of public hostility.”137   
                                                 
131 See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE : 
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132  See id. at 140–42. 
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  The First Amendment right to freedom of association, as 
well as the Fifth Amendment, did not afford similar 
protections to the extensive investigation of Communists in 
the 1950s.138  The hunt for Communists was led by Senator 
Joseph R. McCarthy, and aided with substantial help from 
Hoover.139  The House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC)140 forced individuals to testify publicly about their 
Communist Party ties and to disclose names of others 
involved with the Party.  The public disclosure of people’s 
ties to the Communist Party often resulted in ostracism and 
blacklisting.141  Many journalists, professors and entertainers 
were fired and blacklisted from future employment.142 
 In Barenblatt v. United States,143 a person refused to 
answer the HUAC’s questions and was jailed for contempt.  
The Court held that the First Amendment was not violated by 
the questioning.  In Wilkinson v. United States,144 a witness 
who criticized the HUAC was interrogated about Communist 
ties.  The Court upheld the questioning because there was a 
“reasonable ground to suppose that the petitioner was an 
active Communist Party member.”145  Justice Black 
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 dissented, arguing that “this case involves nothing more nor 
less than an attempt by the Un-American Activities 
Committee to use the contempt power of the House of 
Representatives as a weapon against those who dare to 
criticize it.”146    
 Ultimately, McCarthy experienced a downfall, the HUAC 
was disbanded, and many today view the Communist 
hysteria as a profound overreaction.   
 
B. THE 1960S AND 1970S 
 
1. New Limits on Government Surveillance 
(a) Fourth Amendment Resurgence: Katz v. United States 
 
 The Fourth Amendment underwent a revolution in the 
1960s.  In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,147 the Court held that in all 
criminal proceedings, evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded from evidence in criminal 
trials.148 And in 1967, the Court in Katz v. United States149 
overruled Olmstead.  Katz involved the wiretapping of a 
telephone conversation made by the defendant while in a 
phone booth.  The Court declared: “What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not 
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.”150  From Katz, the 
Court’s current approach to determining the Fourth 
Amendment’s applicability emerged – the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.  The test, articulated in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence, asks whether (1) a person exhibits an 
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 “actual or subjective expectation of privacy” and (2) “the 
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”151 
(b) Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control Act of 
1968 
 
 One year after Katz, in 1968, Congress vastly expanded 
its statutory protections against electronic surveillance 
beyond the limited protection of §605.  Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act152 extended the 
reach of wiretap regulations to state officials as well as to 
private parties.153  Despite its profound increase in the extent 
of protection, Title III had important limitations.  It applied to 
the interception of “aural” communications; it did not apply 
to visual surveillance or other forms of electronic 
communication.   
 
2. The Constitutional Right to Privacy 
(a) Decisional Privacy: Griswold v. Connecticut  
 
 
                                                
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Court held in a series of cases 
that the Constitution protected a “zone of privacy” that 
safeguarded individual autonomy in making certain decisions 
involving their bodies and families.  In 1965, in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,154 the Court held that the government could not 
ban contraceptives. Although the Constitution does not 
explicitly protect a right to privacy, the Court reasoned that 
there such a right is found in the “penumbras” of many of the 
ten amendments of the Bill of Rights.155  Following 
 
151 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
152 Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–22. 
153 See REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY, supra, at 122–25. 
154 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
155 Id. at 484. 
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 Griswold, the Court held in Roe v. Wade156 that the right to 
privacy “encompass[es] a woman’s decision whether or not 
to terminate her pregnancy.”157   
(b) Information Privacy: Whalen v. Roe 
 
 Four years after Roe v. Wade, in 1977, the Court held in 
Whalen v. Roe158 that the constitutionally protected “zone of 
privacy” extends to two distinct types of interests: (1) 
“independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions”; and (2) the “individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.”159  The former interest 
describes Griswold and Roe; the latter interest was one that 
the Court had not yet defined. This latter interest has been 
called the “constitutional right to information privacy.”  The 
Court also articulated this interest in Nixon v. Administrator 
of General Services,160 decided that same year.   
 Following Whalen and Nixon, the Court did not develop 
the right of information privacy.  Nevertheless, a majority of 
circuit courts have recognized this right, which has been 
involved in a substantial number of cases.161  
 
3. Responses to the Rise of the Computer 
 (a) Burgeoning Interest in Privacy 
 
 The development of the computer in 1946 revolutionized 
information collection.  Throughout the second half of the 
20th century, the computer revolutionized the way records 
and data were collected, disseminated, and used.  The 
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 increasing use of computers in the 1960s raised a 
considerable public concern about privacy.162  Commentators 
devoted significant attention to the issue.163  Privacy also 
became an important topic on Congress’s agenda.164   
(b) Freedom of Information Act of 1966 
 
 The growing number of government agencies and the 
expanding regulatory scope of the administrative state led to 
a strong sentiment that government records should be open to 
the public. In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), dramatically reforming public 
access to government records. Under FOIA, “any person” 
may request “records” maintained by an executive agency.165  
People or entities requesting records need not state a reason 
for requesting records.166  Today, all fifty states have 
freedom of information laws, many of which are based upon 
the FOIA.   
 Among nine exceptions to disclosure, the federal FOIA 
contains two exceptions that safeguard privacy.  Exception 6 
exempts “personnel and medical files and similar files the 
                                                 
162 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 (1995). 
163 See, e.g., VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); MYRON 
BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM (1967); ARTHUR MILLER, THE ATTACK ON PRIVACY (1971); 
NOMOS XII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds. 1971); 
ALAN WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: 
COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY  (1972); Kenneth L. Karst, 
“The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of 
Stored Personal Data, 31 L. & Contemp. Probs. 342 (1966); Symposium, 
Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 211-
45 (1968); Symposium, Privacy, 31 L. & Contemp. Probs. 251-435 
(1966). 
164 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, 
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 (1995). 
165 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
166 See, e.g., United States  Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989). 
 27
 disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”167  Exemption (7)(C) exempts 
“records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes . . . which could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”168  
When possible, records with redacted private data are 
disclosed to requesters.169   
(c) Fair Information Practices  
 
 The increasing computerization of information and the 
burgeoning repositories of personal data in federal agencies 
continued to be a topic of importance.  In 1973, the United 
States Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) 
issued a report, Records, Computers, and the Rights of 
Citizens, which analyzed these problems in depth.  The report 
observed:  
 
[A]n individual must increasingly give information about 
himself to large and relatively faceless institutions, for 
handling and use by strangers—unknown, unseen, and, all too 
frequently, unresponsive.  Sometimes the individual does not 
even know that an organization maintains a record about him.  
Often he may not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control 
its dissemination, or challenge its use by others.170 
 
The report recommended the passage of a code of Fair 
Information Practices:  
 
x There must be no personal data record-keeping systems 
whose very existence is secret. 
                                                 
167 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 
168 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
169 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
170 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA 
SYSTEMS 29 (1973). 
 28
 x There must be a way for an individual to find out what 
information about him is in a record and how it is used. 
x There must be a way for an individual to prevent information 
about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made 
available for other purposes without his consent. 
x There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a 
record of identifiable information about him. 
x Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or 
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure 
the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take 
reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.171 
 
As Marc Rotenberg observes, the Fair Information Practices 
“played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the 
United States,”172 and influenced privacy law around the 
world. 
(d) Privacy Act of 1974 
 
 A year after the HEW report, Congress passed the 
Privacy Act of 1974.173  The Act responded to many of the 
concerns raised by HEW.  It regulates the collection and use 
of records by federal agencies, and affords individuals right to 
access and correct their personal information.174  Although the 
Act made important strides in bringing government 
information systems under control, the Act has a number of 
shortcomings.   The Privacy Act does not apply to the private 
sector.  Nor does it apply to state or local agencies. 
 Another limitation in the Privacy Act is the “routine use” 
exception where information may be disclosed for any 
“routine use” if disclosure is “compatible” with the purpose 
for which the agency collected the information.175 Numerous 
commentators have criticized the “routine use” exception as 
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 an enormous loophole.176   
 The Privacy Act also attempted to restrict the use of SSNs. 
The HEW report had noted that there was “an increasing 
tendency” for the SSN to be used as a “standard universal 
identifier.”177 The Privacy Act aimed to “curtail the 
expanding use of social security numbers by federal and local 
agencies and, by so doing, to eliminate the threat to 
individual privacy and confidentiality of information posed 
by common numerical identifiers.”178    
 Unfortunately, the Act did not restrict the use of SSNs by 
the private sector.  As a result, the use of SSNs continued its 
upward trend.179  Today, SSNs are used as a form of 
password to access one’s accounts and records at banks, 
investment firms, schools, and hospitals.180   
(e) Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 
 
 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 
(FERPA),181 otherwise known as the “Buckley Amendment,” 
regulates the accessibility of student records. FERPA does 
not apply to records maintained by school law enforcement 
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 officials182 or health and psychological records.183 
(f) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
 
 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 
1978,184 created a distinct regime for electronic surveillance 
to gather foreign intelligence.  Whereas Title III regulated 
electronic surveillance for domestic law enforcement 
purposes, FISA applied when foreign intelligence gathering 
was “the purpose” of the investigation.185  FISA permits 
electronic surveillance and covert searches pursuant to court 
orders, which are reviewed ex parte by a special court of 
seven federal judges.  Information obtained through FISA 
orders can be used in criminal trials.186  The protections 
against surveillance are much looser than those of Title III.  
Under Title III and the Fourth Amendment, surveillance is 
only authorized if there is a showing of probable cause that 
the surveillance will uncover evidence of criminal activity.  
Under FISA, orders are granted if there is probable cause to 
believe that the monitored party is a “foreign power” or “an 
agent of a foreign power.”187   
 
4. Financial Privacy 
  
 Several important legal developments regarding financial 
privacy occurred throughout the 1970s.  Many of these 
developments involved the lessening of financial privacy. 
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 (a) Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 
 
 In earlier times, in small towns, people could readily 
learn about each others’ financial condition and 
trustworthiness.  Creditors had first-hand information about 
other people or could learn about them through community 
gossip.  In the 20th century, with the bulging population and 
increasing mobility of people, creditors no longer had these 
easy methods to obtain data about people.188   Creditors 
began to rely on records and documents to assess 
reputation.189  These developments spawned credit reporting 
agencies, companies that obtain and report information about 
a person’s credit history. Credit reports contain a detailed 
financial history, financial account information, outstanding 
debts, bankruptcy filings, judgments, liens, and mortgage 
foreclosures.  Today, the three major credit reporting 
agencies (Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union) have 
compiled extensive data about virtually every adult citizen.   
 Due to a series of complaints about erroneous credit 
reports and non-responsiveness by credit reporting agencies,190 
Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in 
1970.191  The FCRA provides limited protections for 
individuals.  It enables people to access their records, and 
restricts the manner in which records are disclosed.  
Individuals can challenge inaccuracies on their reports192 and 
can sue to collect damages for violations of the Act.193 
 However, FCRA immunizes creditors and credit 
reporting agencies from lawsuits for “defamation, invasion of 
privacy, or negligence” except when the information is 
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 “furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such 
consumer.”194  Although the FCRA allows people to sue for 
negligent violations of the Act,195  there is a two-year statute 
of limitations “from the date on which the liability arises.”196   
In TRW, Inc. v. Andrews,197 the Supreme Court held this 
period begins to run when the violations occurred, not when 
the individual discovers them.  Many inaccuracies in credit 
reports, however, are not discovered for a significant period 
of time.   
(b) Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 
 
 The Bank Secrecy Act,198 enacted in 1970, requires banks 
to retain records and create reports to help law enforcement 
investigations.  The Act was passed due to concerns that the 
computerization of records would make white collar crime 
more difficult to detect.199  Federally insured banks must 
record the identities of account holders and maintain copies 
of each financial instrument.  International transactions 
exceeding $5000 are subject to reporting,200 as well as 
domestic transactions exceeding $10,000.201 
 In California Bankers Association v. Shultz,202 the 
Supreme Court upheld the Act against a Fourth Amendment 
challenge by a group of bankers and account holders.  The 
Court concluded that the bankers lacked Fourth Amendment 
rights in the data because “corporations can claim no equality 
with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”203  
The account holders failed to allege that they engaged in 
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 transactions exceeding $10,000, and as a result, lacked 
standing.204   
(c) United States v. Miller  
 
 In 1976, in United States v. Miller,205 the Court held that 
financial records possessed by third parties are not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection.206 Federal agents issued 
subpoenas to banks for the financial records of the defendant.  
The defendant argued that the government needed a warrant 
in order to obtain the information.  The Court concluded that 
the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the records because “the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party 
and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”207  As the 
Court reasoned:  
 
The checks are not confidential communications but 
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.  
All of the documents obtained, including financial statements 
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the 
ordinary course of business.208 
 
(d) Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 
 
 In 1978, two years after Miller, Congress passed the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA),209 which provided 
limited protection of financial records to fill the gap left by 
Miller.  Pursuant to the RFPA, government officials must use 
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 a warrant or subpoena to obtain financial information.210  
There must be “reason to believe that the records sought are 
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”211  Subject 
to certain exceptions, the customer must receive prior notice 
of the subpoena.212   
 
5. The Retreat from Boyd 
 
 The 1886 case, Boyd v. United States, established that the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments prevented the government 
from issuing a subpoena to obtain a person’s private 
papers.213  Later on, in Gouled v. United States,214 the Court 
concluded that the police could not search one’s “house or 
office or papers” to obtain evidence to use against that person 
in a criminal proceeding.215  These two cases established 
what became known as the “mere evidence rule,” which 
barred the seizure of papers unless they were 
instrumentalities of a crime or illegal contraband.  Although 
the mere evidence rule was chipped away in subsequent 
decisions, it was officially eliminated in 1967 in Warden v. 
Hayden.216  In Couch v. United States,217 the Court 
concluded that personal records maintained by third parties 
were not protected by the Fifth Amendment.  The Court 
noted that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal 
privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to 
information that may incriminate him.”218  Since the 
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 subpoena was issued on a third party, “[i]nquisitorial 
pressure or coercion against a potentially accused person, 
compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning 
words or produce incriminating documents is absent.”219  
Similarly, in Fisher v. United States,220 the Court concluded 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply to 
subpoenas for documents maintained by a person’s 
attorney.221  The Fifth Amendment, concluded the court, was 
limited to protecting against only the “compulsion to testify 
against oneself.”222 
 
6. The Narrowing of the Fourth Amendment 
 
 In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court issued several 
decisions constraining the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection  In 1979, the Court concluded in Smith v. 
Maryland223 that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a 
list of the telephone numbers a person dials that were 
recorded by a pen register.224  Since people “know that they 
must convey numerical information to the phone company” 
and that the phone company records this information for 
billing purposes, people cannot “harbor any general 
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”225  
Just three years earlier, the Court in Miller had employed a 
similar rationale with regard to bank records.226   
 In 1978, the Court held in Zurcher v. The Stanford 
Daily,227 that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit state 
authorities from searching the premises of third parties if the 
authorities had probable cause to believe that evidence of a 
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 crime would be located at the property.228  Zurcher involved 
a search of the offices of a newspaper that had taken 
photographs of a violent demonstration.  The newspaper had 
no involvement in the demonstration and nobody at the 
newspaper was suspected of criminal activity.  The 
newspaper argued that searches of their offices “will 
seriously threaten the ability of the press to gather, analyze, 
and disseminate news.”229  The Court, however, concluded 
that the requirements of a warrant “should afford sufficient 
protection” against these harms.230   
C. THE 1980S 
 
1. Receding Fourth Amendment Protection 
 
 Throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a series 
of decisions adopting a narrow view of what constitutes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  For example, in Florida 
v. Riley,231 the Court concluded that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a greenhouse when the police flew 
over it with a helicopter.232  In California v. Greenwood,233 
the Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in garbage left in bags on the curb because “[i]t is 
common knowledge that plastic bags left on or at the side of 
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”234  
The Court also reasoned that the trash was left at the curb 
“for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the 
trash collector, who might himself have sorted through [the] 
trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.”235 
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  In the schools and the workplace, the Court concluded 
that people only have limited expectations of privacy and that 
searches by school officials and government employers are 
not subject to regular Fourth Amendment requirements.  In 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,236 the Court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement “is unsuited to the 
school’s environment” and that probable cause “is not an 
irreducible requirement of a valid search.”237  Likewise, at 
the workplace, the Court held in O’Connor v. Ortega,238 that 
searches by government employers do not require a warrant 
or probable cause; they only need to be “reasonable . . . under 
all circumstances.”239   
 
2. The Growth of Federal Privacy Statutory Protection 
(a) Privacy Protection Act of 1980 
 
 Dissatisfaction over Zurcher led Congress to pass the 
Privacy Protection Act in 1980.240  The Act restricts the 
search or seizure of “any work product materials possessed 
by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to 
disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or 
other similar form of public communication.”241  As a result 
of the Act, a subpoena is needed to obtain work product 
materials, which permits the party to challenge the request in 
court and to produce the documents without having law 
enforcement officials intrude on the premises.        
 (b) Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
 
 The Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of 
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 1984242 protects the privacy of cable records.  Cable 
companies must notify subscribers about the collection and 
use of personal information.243  Companies cannot disclose a 
subscriber’s viewing habits.244  The Act is enforced with a 
private right of action. 
(c) Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 
1988 
 
 As discussed earlier, a major loophole in the Privacy Act 
of 1974 has been the “routine use” exception.245  Under this 
exception, to detect fraud, the federal government in 1977 
began running computer comparisons of employee records 
with the records of people receiving benefits.246 In 1988, 
Congress addressed this practice, known as “computer 
matching” by passing the Computer Matching and Privacy 
Protection Act.247 The law established procedures for 
computer matchings, but did not halt the practice.248  
(d) Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 
 
 In 1988, Congress passed the Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act (EPPA).249  The EPPA prohibits private sector 
employers from using polygraph examinations on employees 
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 and prospective employees.  The Act does not apply to public 
sector employers.250  Employers can, however, use 
polygraphs “in connection with an ongoing investigation 
involving economic loss or injury to the employer’s business, 
such as theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, or an act of 
unlawful industrial espionage or sabotage” when “the 
employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was 
involved in the incident or activity under investigation.”251 
Private sector employers who provide security services are 
exempt.252   
 (e) Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
 
 The confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice 
nominee Robert Bork sparked a law to protect video cassette 
rental data.  Reporters attempted to obtain a list of the videos 
Bork had rented from his video store.  Incensed at this 
practice, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act 
(VPPA) of 1988.253  The VPPA forbids video tape service 
providers from disclosing customer video rental or purchase 
information.254  
 
 
 
3. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
 
 In 1986, Congress revisited its wiretapping law by 
substantially reworking Title III of 1968.  The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)255 expanded Title III 
to new forms of communications, with a particular focus on 
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 computers.  The ECPA restricts the interception of 
transmitted communications256 and the searching of stored 
communications.257  Title I of the ECPA, known as the 
“Wiretap Act,” regulates the interception of 
communications.258 Title II, referred to as  the “Stored 
Communications Act,” governs access to stored 
communications and records held by communications service 
providers (such as ISPs).259  Title III, called the “Pen Register 
Act,” provides limited regulation of pen registers and trap 
and trace devices.260 
 
4. OECD Guidelines and International Privacy 
 
 Internationally, there was substantial growth in 
information privacy law.  The most significant development 
was the creation of guidelines for the protection of 
information privacy by the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1980.261 The 
OECD Privacy Guidelines built upon the Fair Information 
Practices articulated by HEW in 1973.  The OECD 
Guidelines contain eight principles: (1) collection limitation 
– data should be collected lawfully with the individual’s 
consent; (2) data quality – data should be relevant to a 
particular purpose and be accurate; (3) purpose specification 
–the purpose for data collection should be stated at the time 
of the data collection and the use of the data should be 
limited to this purpose; (4) use limitation – data should not be 
disclosed for different purposes without the consent of the 
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 individual; (5) security safeguards – data should be protected 
by reasonable safeguards; (6) openness principle – 
individuals should be informed about the practices and 
polices of those handling their personal information; (7) 
individual participation – people should be able to learn 
about the data that an entity possesses about them and to 
rectify errors or problems in that data; (8) accountability – 
the entities that control personal information should be held 
accountable for carrying out these principles.   
D. THE 1990S 
 
1. The Internet, Computer Databases, and Privacy 
 
 The last decade of the 20th century presented profound 
new challenges for the protection of information privacy, 
such as rise of the Internet and the increasing use of email in 
the mid-1990s.  The Internet presented new methods of 
gathering information.  When a person visits a website, the 
website can record information about the person and how the 
person navigates the website. This information is referred to 
as “clickstream data.”  To identify users, companies use an 
identifying tag known as a “cookie,” a text file that is stored 
on the user’s computer.  When the user returns to the 
website, the site searches for its cookie, which identifies the 
user and allows the website to access the data it collected 
about the user from her previous web surfing activity.  
Another information collection device, known as a “web 
bug,” secretly uses pixel tags to gather data about the user.262   
 Throughout the 1990s, the collection and use of personal 
information in computer databases rapidly accelerated.  The 
decade saw the rise of an entire industry devoted to 
aggregating personal information for use by marketers – the 
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 database industry.  Hundred companies gather personal data 
and create massive databases which they then rent to 
marketers.  The industry generates billions of dollars each 
year.263    
 
2. The Continued Growth of Federal Statutory Protection 
  
 As in the 1980s, Congress continued to pass a number 
of major statutes to address emerging privacy problems.   
(a) Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 
 
 In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (TCPA),264 which permits people to request 
that telemarketers not call them again.  If the telemarketer 
continues to call, people can sue for damages of up to five 
hundred dollars for each call.265   
(b) Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 
 
 For many years, states had been selling their motor 
vehicle records to marketers.266  The sale of this information 
generated millions of dollars to states, and individuals had no 
way to block the dissemination of their personal data.267 In 
1994, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 
(DPPA),268 which requires that states first obtain a person’s 
consent before disclosing her motor vehicle record 
information to marketers.269  The law was challenged on 
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 federalism grounds, but in   Reno v. Condon,270 the Supreme 
Court held that DPPA fell within Congress’s authority to 
regulate interstate commerce:  
 
The motor vehicle information which the States have 
historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct 
marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to 
contact drivers with customized solicitations.  The information 
is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various 
public and private entities for matters related to interstate 
motoring.271 
 
This decision has important implications for many federal 
privacy statutes.  Even in the face of the Court’s trend to 
limit Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, the 
Court recognized that the dissemination of personal 
information is an issue of interstate commerce.   
(c) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 
 
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) of 1996 is the first federal statute to directly 
address health privacy.272  HIPPA required the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to draft regulations to 
protect the privacy of medical records.273  HHS’s regulations, 
among other things, require that people authorize all uses and 
disclosures of their health information that are not for 
treatment, payment, or health care operation (such as for 
marketing purposes).274  
 HIPAA does have some important limitations.  First, not 
all medical records are covered – only records maintained by 
certain types of record-holders: health plans, health care 
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 clearinghouses, and health care providers.275  Although 
physicians, hospitals, pharmacists, and health insurers are 
covered, other parties that have medical information are 
not.276  For example, many websites gather health 
information when conducting medical assessments, but these 
websites are not covered by HIPAA.277   
 Second, the regulations contain a broad provision for law 
enforcement access.  They permit law enforcement officials 
to obtain medical records with only a subpoena rather than a 
warrant.278  Additionally, law enforcement officials can 
obtain health data if they request it “for the purpose of 
identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness, 
or missing person.”279   
 (d) Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
 
 The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
of 1998,280 governs the collection of children’s personal 
information on the Internet.281 The law only applies to 
children under the age of 13.282  Children’s websites must 
post privacy policies and obtain “parental consent for the 
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from 
children.”283  COPPA applies only to websites “directed to 
children” or where the operator of the website “has actual 
knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a 
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 child.”284  
 
(e) The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
 
 In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
(GLB) Act,285 which allows financial institutions with 
different branches or affiliates engaging in different services 
to share the “nonpublic personal information” among each 
branch of the company.  Affiliates must inform customers of 
the information sharing, but people have no right to stop the 
companies from sharing it.  However, when financial 
institutions desire to share customer data with third parties, 
people have a right to opt-out.286   
 The GLB Act resulted in a mass mailing of privacy 
policies to customers, informing them that data might be 
shared with other companies and giving people a number to 
call or a form to fill out if they wanted to block this data 
sharing.  The opt-out provisions of the Act were strongly 
criticized.  For example, as Ted Janger and Paul Schwartz 
noted, very few customers have opted-out.287  The reasons, 
they stated, are that privacy policies are hard to understand 
and are sometimes misleading; and opt-out rights are difficult 
and cumbersome to exercise.288  
 
3. The FTC and Privacy Policies 
 
 Since 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
been bringing actions against companies that violate their 
own privacy policies.  The FTC has interpreted the FTC Act, 
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 which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce,”289 to be infringed when a company 
breaks a promise it made in its privacy policy.  The FTC can 
bring civil actions and seek injunctive remedies.  Since it 
began enforcing the Act in this manner, the FTC has brought 
several high-profile cases, almost all of which have resulted 
in settlements.290   
 
4. The EU Data Protection Directive 
 
 In 1996, the European Union promulgated the Data 
Protection Directive which establishes basic principles for 
privacy legislation for European Union member countries.  As 
Joel Reidenberg explains: 
 
The background and underlying philosophy of the European 
Union Directive differs in important ways from that of the 
United States. . . . [T]he United States has, in recent years, left 
the protection of privacy to markets rather than law.  In 
contrast, Europe treats privacy as a political imperative 
anchored in fundamental human rights.291 
 
 The EU Data Protection Directive provides for a 
comprehensive protection of personal information 
maintained by a broad range of entities.  This omnibus 
approach exists in stark contrast to the United States’ 
approach, which regulates privacy “sectorally” in various 
narrow contexts.292   
 The EU Data Protection Directive also contains 
restrictions on the flow of personal data outside the borders 
of EU nations to other countries not governed by the 
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 Directive.  Data can be transferred to a third country if the 
country “ensures an adequate level of protection.”293  As 
Peter Swire and Robert Litan observed, the vastly different 
approaches of the United States and EU presented significant 
problems, since the United States may not be found to have 
an “adequate level of protection” and this would have severe 
commercial implications.294  In 1998, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce began negotiating with the EU so that the United 
States would satisfy the Directive’s requirement of having 
adequate protection.    In 2000, an agreement was reached, 
known as the Safe Harbor Arrangement.  Under the 
Arrangement, U.S. companies can voluntarily agree to follow 
principles (drawn from the Fair Information Practices).  
Compliance with the principles will be enforced by the FTC 
and Department of Transportation.295 
 
V. THE 21ST CENTURY 
A. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: PRIVACY IN A WORLD OF 
TERROR 
 
 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, the nation awakened to the reality that there were 
dangerous terrorist cells within U.S. borders.  Shortly after 
September 11, there was a strong political drive for new 
surveillance measures and new powers for law enforcement 
officials.    
B. THE USA-PATRIOT ACT 
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  In a very short time after September 11, Congress passed 
the “Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act” (USA-PATRIOT Act) of 2001.  The Act 
made several significant changes to the ECPA and FISA, 
among other statutes.  In one significant amendment, the 
USA-PATRIOT Act enlarged the definition of pen registers 
and trap and trace devices to apply to addressing information 
on e-mails and to “IP addresses.”296  The Act also provided 
for new justifications for delayed notice of search warrants, 
increasing the types of subscriber records that could be 
obtained from ISPs and communications providers, and 
allowing for a nationwide scope for pen register orders and 
search warrants for email.297  Additionally, the Act expanded 
the application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA).  Previously, the looser protections of FISA applied 
only when “the purpose” of the investigation was to gather 
foreign intelligence.  The USA-PATRIOT Act expanded 
FISA’s application to instances when foreign intelligence 
gathering was “a significant purpose” of the investigation.298  
The Act also provided for roving wiretaps under FISA as 
well as increased sharing of foreign intelligence information 
between law enforcement entities.299     
C. NEW SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 Recently, a series of new surveillance technologies and 
techniques have been grabbing headlines.  In 2000, the Wall 
Street Journal reported that the FBI had developed a device 
known as “Carnivore” to intercept people’s email and instant 
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 messaging information from their ISPs.  Carnivore is 
installed directly to the ISP’s server and it can search through 
email of particular individuals.  In 2001, a case called United 
States v. Scarfo,300 revealed the existence of a device that can 
be secretly installed into one’s computer to log all of a 
person’s the keystrokes.  And news reports revealed that the 
FBI had developed a computer virus called “Magic Lantern” 
that could be deployed into a person’s computer to record her 
keystrokes.   
 In 2001, police in Tampa, Florida, began using a 
surveillance system known as “face recognition” that would 
match people’s faces on surveillance cameras to mug shots in 
a databases.   
 In late 2002, a project by the Department of Defense 
known as “Total Information Awareness” (TIA) came to 
light. TIA involves the creation of a central government 
database of personal information.301  The database is to be 
composed of data gathered from the private sector, including 
information about finances, education, travel, and health. 
 As with all new threats to privacy, these measures 
engendered significant criticism.   Recently, the U.S. Senate 
voted to halt TIA.  And in a 2001 Supreme Court case, Kyllo 
v. United States,302 the Court held that the use of a thermal 
imaging device to detect heat patters emanating from a 
person’s home fell within the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Previously, cases involving various sensory 
enhancement devices had concluded that these devices 
merely extend what can be detected through the unaided 
senses.303  In contrast, in Kyllo, the Court noted: “It would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely 
unaffected by the advance of technology. . . . The question 
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we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of 
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”304 
 However, challenges to privacy remain.  Although TIA 
has been halted, many similar information gathering projects 
by the government are underway.  New surveillance and data 
collection technologies continue to be developed and 
deployed.  The law of information privacy never has time to 
rest.     
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Information privacy law has come a long way.  Spurred 
by the development of new technologies, the law has 
responded in numerous ways to grapple with emerging 
privacy problems.  Although the law has made great strides, 
much work remains to be done.  Several scholars, including 
myself, have criticized the ability of information privacy 
laws thus far to grapple with the growing collection and use 
of personal information in computer databases.305  As Paul 
Schwartz observes, “personal information in the private 
sector is often unaccompanied by the presence of basic legal 
protections.  Yet, private enterprises now control more 
powerful resources of information technology than ever 
before.”306   
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